






Alliance Policy Report: Do Health and Longevity Create Wealth?
Health, of course, is vital for productivity and
quality of life, and it is understood that as society
accumulates more wealth it can provide better
health benefits for its people. But health as a driver
of the economy is a relatively new concept within
scholarly and economics circles. In recent years,
many of the foremost schools of economic
thought—among them the Rand Corporation and
the Universities of Chicago, Belfast, Harvard,
and Yale—have come to recognize health as a
critical driver of the economy.
During his tenure as an economist at the
International Longevity Center-USA, Anthony
Webb undertook an intensive exploration of the
existent scholarly literature on the connection
between health and wealth. The resulting report is
a thoughtful and carefully nuanced examination of
the subject. Dr. Webb discusses trends in dispari-
ties in health and longevity, and the evidence
regarding whether health and longevity do indeed
create wealth. Consideration is given to the
impact of improvements in health and increases in
longevity on the level of investment in both
human and physical capital, as well as the
impacts, both direct and indirect, of health on
labor productivity and wealth accumulation.
The International Longevity Centers of Great
Britain, France, and the United States developed
the Alliance for Health & the Future to focus upon
issues that relate to Europe. We believe the concept
“health creates wealth” counters the widely held
notion that longevity and population aging are 
economic threats that put a drain on society.
Furthermore, we believe it is time to recognize that
health results in productive engagement throughout
life. The growing industries that serve older people,
such as health care, pharmaceuticals, living arrange-
ments, and financial services, offer a very different
way of thinking about our future.
As Robert Fogel, 1993 Nobel laureate in economics,
noted, “The railroad was the economic driver in the
nineteenth century, the automobile [and oil] in 
the twentieth, and health care innovation will be 
in the twenty-first.”







“Health is the greatest wealth.”
Virgil (70 - 19 B.C.)
INTRODUCTION
Historical background
The past 200 years have seen enormous increases
in life expectancy at birth. These increases began
in Northwestern Europe and have become world-
wide, so that with the exception of sub-Saharan
countries affected by AIDS, tuberculosis, and
malaria, life expectancy at birth in almost all coun-
tries today is at least double that achieved in
Northwestern Europe in the eighteenth century.
Although there have been recent declines in life
expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa and the former
Soviet Union, many demographers believe that life
expectancy will continue to increase in coming
decades, even in those societies with the greatest
longevity. Longer term, there is disagreement as to
the potential for increases in human longevity.
Increases in longevity need not be associated with
improvements in the average health of the popula-
tion. It is possible that they could be associated
with a decrease in the average level of health if
people who would otherwise have died now sur-
vive in poor health. It is not a straightforward
matter to determine whether average health is
improving or declining. Whereas measuring past
trends in mortality merely requires accurate records
of births and deaths, measuring trends in health
requires not only the application of medical diag-
nostic skills that may have improved over time, but
also that account be taken of the changing pattern
and effects of disease and changes in the age struc-
ture of the population. Diseases that were once
debilitating or fatal may now be curable or at least
manageable so that statistics on the incidence of a
particular disease, even if they are reliable and even
when adjusted for changes in the age structure of
the population, may give a misleading indication
of the burden of that disease on that population.
It is well known that there have been dramatic
reductions in the incidence of many acute infec-
tious diseases. The evidence that I will present
shows that there have also been dramatic reduc-
tions in the incidence, increases in the average age
of onset, and progress in the treatment of many of
the chronic diseases of old age.
Why study the relationship between health,
wealth, and longevity?
There is good reason to anticipate that improve-
ments in health and increases in longevity will
have profound economic consequences, affecting
health care costs, labour-force participation rates,
worker productivity, and the financing of both
funded and pay-as-you-go pension systems, to
name just a few of the most obvious.
Countries are at widely differing stages of the
“demographic transition,” the transition from 
high birthrates and short life expectancy to low
birthrates and much greater life expectancy. One of
the earliest life tables that I have seen is based on
data collected in Northampton, England, in the year
1793, and it shows an infant mortality rate, the
probability that a child will die before its first birth-
day, of 26 percent.1 Fogel (1994) tells us that, in the
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eighteenth century, life expectancy and general
health were even worse in countries such as France.
No country today has an infant mortality rate even
approaching that level, and all countries are at least
along the path to low mortality and low fertility.2
However, no country has yet reached a steady state
in which both fertility and mortality rates have sta-
bilised, and in which the effects of past changes are
no longer significantly affecting the age distribution
or the rate of growth of the population.3 An under-
standing of the economic consequences of demo-
graphic changes can therefore help all countries
predict and plan for the future.
Improvements in health and longevity have been
associated with dramatic increases in health care
expenditure, not only in dollar terms but also as a
percentage of gross national product. But this does
not necessarily mean that the improvements in
health and longevity are causing the increase in
medical expenditures. As societies become richer,
they will naturally choose to spend part of their
increased income on additional medical care. In
economic parlance the “income elasticity of
demand” for health care, the percentage increase in
health care expenditures divided by the percentage
increase in income, is greater than zero.
Improvements in medical technology may also shift
the demand curve, although economic theory is
ambiguous about whether this will lead to an
increase or a decrease in health care expenditure.
Improvements in medical technology may lower the
cost of a medical procedure. People will respond to
the reduction in price by demanding more of the
procedure and possibly substituting that procedure
for other similar procedures. If the “price elasticity
of demand” for the procedure, the percentage
increase in the quantity consumed divided by the
percentage reduction in the price, is greater than
one, then total expenditure will increase. If it is less
than one, total expenditure will decrease.
New medical interventions may also enhance the
range of treatment possibilities. To the extent that
previously unavailable treatments are undertaken,
then health costs will rise, but new medical tech-
nology may also substitute for older and less effec-
tive or more expensive technologies.
Average medical expenditures increase with age, so
one might conclude that increased longevity will
result in an increased demand for medical care.
But average medical expenditures may, in fact, be
more closely related to proximity to death than to
age. Furthermore, improvements in age-specific
levels of health may shift any residual relationship
between age and medical expenses so that, over
time, people of any given age need less health care.
Although we observe increases in both longevity
and health care expenditure in time series data,
this correlation does not imply causality, and a
proper analysis needs to take account of all the
factors referred to above.
These health care expenditures have an “opportuni-
ty cost,” the other desirable goods and services on
which the money could alternatively have been
spent. It is therefore reasonable to ask whether 
the health and longevity benefits have exceeded
the costs and whether we spent too much or too
little on health care.
But why do we pose these questions in relation to
health care and not, with the same force, in relation
to other categories of expenditure? Health care dif-
fers from many other goods and services in that the
amount an individual pays for health care depends
only to a very limited extent on the quantity of care
he or she consumes. There are many reasons why
this is so. Considerations of equity between the sick
and the healthy may influence government policy
toward the financing of health care, as might con-
cerns about the efficiency of private health insur-
ance markets. Also there are very likely substantial
positive externalities associated with health care.
For example, vaccination programs not only reduce
the probability that an individual becomes infected
with a disease, but also may confer “herd immun-
ity,” a reduction in the incidence of the disease
among the whole population, the benefit of which
does not accrue exclusively to the individual who is
vaccinated. A healthy individual may earn more
than someone who is unhealthy, and the govern-
ment may capture part of the additional earnings
through the tax system. These externalities may
result in the individual investing less than the
socially optimal amount in his health care and sug-
gest a role for government in subsidising its provi-
sion. More recent evidence, discussed in this paper,
suggests the existence of a potentially even more
important positive externality, namely that good
health can also substantially enhance a country’s
rate of economic growth.
But all expenditures have an opportunity cost: the
other desirable goods and services on which the
money could have been spent. It is therefore legiti-
mate to ask whether the “right” amount is being
spent on health care, inclusive of administrative,
billing, and marketing costs, and whether, at the
margin, health care benefits, evaluated in terms 
of improved health, increased longevity, and more
rapid economic growth, exceed expenditures.4
Organisation of the paper
The remainder of this paper is organised as 
follows. In Section 2, I define health, wealth, and
longevity. In Section 3, I discuss trends in longevity,
health, and wealth over the past 200 years. I focus
not only on averages but also on trends in dispari-
ties in health and longevity. In Section 4, I consid-
er the evidence as to whether health and longevity
do indeed create wealth. I review the literature on
the relationship between health, longevity, and
health care expenditures and examine the claim
that increases in health expenditures are the result,
as well as the cause, of increased longevity. I then
consider the direct and indirect impacts of health
on labour productivity and wealth accumulation.
Concerns are often expressed about the impact of
increased longevity on the dependency ratio, the
ratio of those aged 18 to 64 to those aged under
18 and over 64. I consider whether these concerns
are justified.
I also consider the literature that attempts to put a
value on the outputs of health care expenditures—the
improvements in health and additional years of life
that the expenditures buy and whether the returns
justify the costs. I then consider the impact of
improvements in health and increases in longevity on
the level of investment in both human and physical
capital and the economic consequences of the “demo-
graphic dividend,” the temporary reduction in the
dependency ratio that is a demographic consequence
of the transition from high to low mortality and fertil-
ity. Finally, I say a few words about the impact of
population aging on the structure of the economy.
Section 5 concludes. I argue that concerns about
projected increases in the dependency ratio are
largely mistaken. I also argue that although we 
are right to be concerned about inefficiencies and
misallocations of resources in the health care sys-
tem, on average, we get a good return on our invest-
ment. I argue that, on average, but not necessarily at
the margin, health care expenditures offer a hand-
some return in terms of increased wealth, to say
nothing of the enormous value that, under any
plausible method of accounting, one might place on
the additional years of health and life.
2. DEFINING AND MEASURING LONGEVITY,
HEALTH, AND WEALTH
Defining and measuring longevity
In advanced industrial countries, reliable mortality
records go back almost 200 years. For example, the
United Kingdom established a national system 
of registration of births and deaths in 1837.
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Demographers usually measure longevity in terms
of life expectancy at birth, either of a population
alive at a particular time or of a population born in
a particular year, the former being recorded in a
period life table and the latter in a cohort life
table. We don’t actually know the average longevity
of a particular birth cohort until the last member of
that cohort has died. Calculations of the life
expectancies of more and more recent birth
cohorts therefore increasingly depend on forecasts
of trends in mortality rates.
Societies with similar life expectancies at birth
can have quite different mortality profiles with
quite different economic consequences. The death
of an infant is a personal tragedy for the family,
but its economic consequences are much less than
those that result from the death of a prime-age
worker. Infant mortality rates were extremely high
in the nineteenth century, so that remaining life
expectancy at 1 year of age was actually greater
than life expectancy at birth. Individuals surviving
early childhood had a good chance of surviving to
late middle age. Social Security Administration
cohort life tables show that an American male
born in 1850 stood a 14.6 percent chance of dying
before his first birthday, but that having attained
age 20 (in 1870), he could expect to live to 61.9
years of age. Mortality rates at all ages were far
higher among the poor than among the better off.
In contrast, sub-Saharan Africa achieves similar
life expectancy with lower infant mortality rates,
but higher mortality rates among prime-age work-
ers, together with a reversal of the usual inverse
relationship between adult mortality and socioeco-
nomic status.5
Defining and measuring health
Defining health is much more difficult. One might
define it in terms of the presence or absence of par-
ticular diseases. But if we are to make a comparison
between countries or over time, we must take
account of changes in the pattern of disease.
Furthermore, the consequences of diseases have
changed dramatically, with improvements in disease
management and in the services available to the
infirm. A person who has a particular disease may
justifiably regard himself as being in good health if
the disease is not life threatening, if its symptoms
can be controlled, and if it has no effect on his abil-
ity to perform activities of daily living (ADLs).
An alternative measure of the burden of disease is
the effect of ill health on individuals’ abilities to
perform ADLs or to pursue their chosen occupa-
tion. But the consequences of many disabilities
depend on the support available to the individual
and on the consequences for the individual of
being unable to perform particular ADLs. For
example, the consequences of being unable to
climb stairs very much depend on whether one’s
building has an elevator. The consequences of
many disabilities may be less serious today as a
result of the reduction in the proportion of occupa-
tions requiring manual labour and the proliferation
of labour-saving devices.
There are also particular problems when compar-
ing countries and time periods. Some diseases may
be asymptomatic and will remain undiagnosed in
the absence of a medical examination. But the
likelihood of an individual receiving a medical
examination may vary across countries, and with
age, birth cohort, gender, socioeconomic status, and
the individual’s assessment of the affordability 
and efficacy of any possible treatment. Techniques
of medical diagnosis have improved over time and
will vary across countries. Social surveys rarely
have the resources to conduct medical examina-
tions of their participants and must rely on self-
reported health data. Data that includes medical
records will, with rare exceptions, identify only the
presence of illness in those who have chosen to
seek medical advice.
A particular problem is the interaction of longevity
with disease. An intervention that prolongs the life
of an individual will reduce the average health of
the whole population if that individual’s health
status following treatment is worse than that of the
remainder of the population. We cannot assume
that improvements in health care will improve
average health. For example, improvements in
postnatal care may improve the average health of
infants who would have survived anyway but may
also result in the survival of infants in very poor
health who would otherwise have died. The extent
to which one effect dominates the other will be
determined both by the available technology and
also by the choices that are made as to the circum-
stances in which that technology should be
applied. Expenditure on health care may be having
substantial beneficial effects on mortality and on
the health of people who would have survived any-
way, even at a time when the average health of the
surviving population appears to be declining.
The World Health Organization (WHO) meas-
ures “health-adjusted life expectancy” (HALE),
defined as the number of years or the percentage
of life that the average individual in various coun-
tries can expect to survive in full health given 
current mortality and disability rates. Their data
suggests that, at least on a between-country 
comparison, increased longevity is resulting in a
compression of morbidity in both relative and
absolute terms. With some exceptions, people in
long-lived societies not only spend a dramatically
smaller proportion of their lives in ill health but
also spend fewer years in ill health. For example,
WHO data show that men in Japan and France
can expect to live to 73.6 and 71.3 years, respec-
tively, yet will spend only 8.3 and 8.7 percent of
their lives in ill health, or 6.6 and 6.5 years, respec-
tively. In contrast, men in Brazil can expect to
spend 13 percent of their lives, or 9.8 years, in ill
health. The main exception to the rule that low
mortality is associated with fewer years in ill health
is in sub-Saharan Africa, where, due to the AIDS
epidemic and until recently the absence of effective
treatment, people typically spend an extremely
small proportion of their short lives in ill health.
In addition to focusing on changes in the average
health of a population, one may also wish to exam-
ine changes in health disparities, for example
between men and women, between people of dif-
ferent socioeconomic classes, and in the evolution
of health status throughout the life course. A sig-
nificant problem here is that people in poorer
health and in lower socioeconomic classes experi-
ence higher mortality. Differential mortality can
result in biased estimates of the relationship
between health status and socioeconomic class.
Defining and measuring wealth
Wealth can be regarded as either a stock, the cap-
ital value of all the net assets owned by the indi-
vidual or society; or a flow, the annual income
that those assets produce. A comprehensive
measure of wealth might include human capital,
the aggregation of personal attributes and invest-
ments in education and on-the-job training that
enhance an individual’s productivity. Grossman
(1972) introduced the concept of health capital,
a component of human capital, the collection of
skills and attributes that enhance an individual’s
productivity.6 Individuals can be thought of as
being endowed at birth with an initial amount of
health capital. They and their family can main-
tain or enhance this initial capital through invest-
ment in “health preventive activities,” activities
that maintain or enhance their health status, or
they can deplete initial capital through activities
that are deleterious to their health.
Health capital not only enhances an individual’s
productivity but also has an intrinsic value, and 
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a proper accounting of the costs and benefits of
improvements in health and increases in longevity
should take account of that value.
Calculating an individual’s or a society’s stock of
wealth is not a straightforward matter. The capi-
tal values of some assets, for example human and
health capital, are not readily observable because
the relevant markets are limited or nonexistent.
But the absence of a market doesn’t mean that
the asset has no value or should be disregarded in
an accounting of costs and benefits. We can infer
the values that people place on such nontraded
assets from the decisions that they make over
such matters as occupational choice. I return later
to discuss the appropriateness of the methodolo-
gies customarily used.
The capital values of other assets will depend not
only on the income or cash flow they currently
produce, but also on expectations about future
increases in income and on the interest rate at
which one discounts the anticipated cash flow or
income. Some assets, for example domestically
held government bonds, may represent assets of
some members of society but have zero net value
to society as a whole. Accounting for Social
Security and other pay-as-you-go pension entitle-
ments is particularly difficult.7 The expected pres-
ent value of a household’s current or future
entitlement to Social Security is a financial asset,
even though the household can neither sell it nor
borrow against it. However, prior to retirement,
households also hold a liability, in the form of the
expected present value of their future contribu-
tions, and even after retirement the value that a
household places on its Social Security entitle-
ment may be reduced by the net burden, if any,
that Social Security places on their children.
In view of these issues, it may sometimes be easier
to measure the wealth of an individual or society
in terms of the income flow that the stock of
wealth produces. One commonly used measure of
the flow of income in a country is per capita gross
national product (GNP), the sum of the market
value of all the goods and services produced in the
country in a given year, divided by population.
Some assets are not income producing, and
although statisticians impute income for some
such assets, for example owner-occupied housing,
they do not do so for others, for example public
infrastructure. The equivalent measure of a partic-
ular household’s flow of wealth is simply that
household’s income, again after inputting income
from owner-occupied assets.
The major disadvantage of these flow-based
measures of income is that they tell us little about
the sustainability of the income, either at a
national level, where revenues from the extraction
of nonrenewable resources are counted as income,
or at a household level, where individuals may be
approaching ages at which they may be either
unable or unwilling to continue working.
Each measure has its particular strengths and
weaknesses and may be more appropriate for par-
ticular analyses. For example, per capita GNP is
possibly the most appropriate yardstick of the
financial wealth of a society, although it takes
account of health capital only to the extent that it
is reflected in the value of output. Broad-based
measures of wealth, including the financial assets,
housing, and the present value of employer pen-
sions and Social Security, are probably the best
measure of the wealth of individual households
entering or already in retirement.
In addition to per capita GNP, one may wish to
consider the distribution of income and how
changes in health disparities might affect the dis-
tribution of income and wealth.
3.TRENDS IN LONGEVITY, HEALTH, AND
WEALTH
Trends in longevity
In Northwestern Europe and the United States,
reliable mortality records date back to the early
nineteenth century, and in some countries, for
example Sweden, even earlier. In the United
States, the average life expectancy at birth of men
and women was around 33 years in the eigh-
teenth century. According to Social Security
Administration data and forecasts, male and
female life expectancy was 46.6 and 49.4 years,
respectively, for the 1850 birth cohort, 51.5 and
58.3 years for the 1900 birth cohort, and is 
projected to be 72.2 and 78.6 years for the 
1950 birth cohort and 79.9 and 84.4 years for 
the 2000 birth cohort. Although mortality rates
increased in both Britain and the United States
in the middle of the nineteenth century, the pat-
tern otherwise is one of continuing reductions in
mortality.8 The earlier improvements resulted
from reductions in mortality at younger ages, par-
ticularly infant mortality, and more recent
improvements resulted primarily from reductions
in mortality at more advanced ages. To illustrate,
Cutler and Meara (2001) calculate that in the
first four decades of the last century 80 percent 
of life expectancy improvements resulted from
reduced mortality for those below age 45, with
the bulk of this for infants and children. In the
last four decades, about two-thirds of the
improvements resulted from reductions in mor-
tality among those over age 45.
There is a debate between mathematical and bio-
logical demographers as to whether we are
approaching some natural limit to human longev-
ity. Biological demographers argue that there are
biological limits to human longevity and that we
are approaching those limits and should expect a
deceleration in the rate of increase of average
longevity. Mathematical demographers, while 
conceding the existence of biological limits to
longevity, often argue that, at least for short- and
medium-term projections, the best forecasts are
those derived from an analysis of the pattern and
determinants of past increases in longevity. Thus
Wilmoth (2000) argues that there is a highly sta-
ble trend toward increasing longevity and that the
best forecast of life expectancy in the middle of 
the twenty-first century is obtained by an extrapo-
lation of past trends, whereas Olshansky, Carnes,
and Cassel (1990) postulate that we are approach-
ing biologically fixed limits to human longevity.
Olshansky believes that average life expectancy
will not attain 100 years anytime soon, if indeed it
ever does. Although similar claims have proved to
be incorrect in the past, this does not mean that
Olshansky’s current forecast will likewise transpire
to be mistaken. Olshansky has famously made a
$500 million wager, payable in 2150, with biologist
Stephen Austad that someone already born will
live to be 150 by 2150.
Analysis of Social Security Administration period
life tables suggests that mortality improvements
among older women in the United States have 
stabilised and possibly even been reversed over the
past 20 years. My analysis of these tables shows
that in 1900, a woman who was lucky enough to
survive to age 80 stood a 14 percent chance of
dying before her 81st birthday. By 1950, 1980, and
1990, the probabilities had dropped to 8.7, 6.2,
and 5.6 percent, respectively, but by 2000 the death
rate had crept up to 5.7 percent. More significant
than the magnitude of the increase is the bend in
the trend, the fact that an apparently steady pattern
of mortality reductions has come to an end.
What is puzzling is that the pattern of mortality
reductions has come to an end during a period in
which there has been substantial progress in the
treatment of coronary heart disease, which is a
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major cause of premature death. Some commenta-
tors attribute the cessation of mortality reductions
to increasing obesity. More speculatively, it is
possible that reductions in the mortality risk
associated with risky behaviours, such as eating
too much or indulging in unsafe sex, encourage
those behaviours, with people choosing to take
part of the benefit of medical progress not in the
form of lower mortality but in the form of the
adoption of riskier and preferred lifestyles.
Trends in health
I have already referred to the difficulties involved
in calculating the extent of improvements in
health. Using Union Army veteran records, Fogel
(2004) shows that, among males of any given age,
there have been dramatic declines in the incidence
of chronic disease and that there have also been
increases in the average age of onset.9 Costa (2000)
compared the incidence of five functional limita-
tions among men aged 50 to 74 in 1988 to 1994
with their incidence among Union Army veterans
of the same age a century earlier. She found that
the incidence of these functional limitations had
declined by around 40 percent over the twentieth
century. She attributed 37 percent of the decline to
reductions in the incidence of chronic ill health,
and 24 percent to reductions in the effects of such
ill health. Keppel et al. (2002) find that further
reductions in many health disparities were
achieved over the period 1990 to 1998.
Cutler and Meara (1999) document significant
declines during the period 1984 to 1994 in the
proportion of elderly men that is severely dis-
abled. Among those 65–69, the proportion that
was severely disabled (defined as having three or
more ADLs or being institutionalised) dropped
from 10.4 to 9.5 percent. But among those aged
80–84, it dropped from 37.6 to 30.3 percent, and
among those aged 85-plus, it dropped from 63.7
to 57.1 percent.
Trends in wealth
Over the course of the twentieth century, per cap-
ita GDP in the United States has increased some-
what more than fivefold, the increase in the
United Kingdom being somewhat less. Percentage
increases in per capita GDP in Japan and most of
Western Europe have been even greater.
According to Maddison (1995) and IMF staff
estimates, at constant 2000 prices per capita GDP
in the United States rose from $4,096 in 1900 to
$27,272 in 2000. In Japan, it rose from $1,135 
to $20,616, and in the United Kingdom from
$4,593 to $19,704. In the United States and the
United Kingdom, these increases followed a century
of less rapid GDP  growth. Over the course of the
nineteenth century, per capita GDP  in the United
Kingdom grew at an average rate of about 1.2 per-
cent, so per capita GDP in the United Kingdom at
the start of the Industrial Revolution probably
amounted to about $1,360 in 2000 dollars, some-
where near where it is today, in purchasing power
parity terms, in much of sub-Saharan Africa.
With some notable exceptions, there had been a
decline in the relative incomes of those countries
that were already poor in 1900. Although econo-
mists have, for many years, constructed within-
country income distributions, it is only recently
that a similar calculation has been attempted on a
global basis. Sala-i-Martin (2002) calculates that,
over the period 1980 to 1998, global inequality has
actually declined due largely, but not solely, to ris-
ing real incomes in China.
However, the above calculations of growth in per
capita GDP do not take into account reductions in
mortality and cross-country convergence in mor-
tality rates. In 1900, life expectancy at birth 
in the United States was 51.5 years for men and
58.3 years for women. In 2000, the only non–
sub-Saharan African countries that had not
attained this level of life expectancy were
Afghanistan, Haiti, Bhutan, and Laos, yet many
countries had yet to attain the level of per capita
income that the United States had achieved in
1900. As I will show later, if one includes in GDP
the value of mortality improvements, then there has,
in fact, been a substantial reduction in global income
inequality over the course of the last century.
Trends in within-country disparities in longevity,
health, and wealth
Socioeconomic and racial differences in mortality
have been substantially reduced, but not elimin-
ated, over the course of the twentieth century.
Fogel (2004) calculates that the disparity between
the highest and lowest infant mortality rates
among 120 wards in six U.S. cities declined by 83
percent over the first half of the twentieth century.
He also reports similar reductions in disparities in
British life expectancies at birth.
Fogel argues persuasively that adult height is a
good indicator of health status and that relative
height is a good measure of relative health status.
Using army records, Steckel (2001) documents the
changes in average adult height that have occurred
over the past millennium. As is well known, aver-
age height has increased considerably over the last
200 years. For example, in Sweden, the average
height of army conscripts increased from 167 to
179 centimetres (65.7 to 70.4 inches) over the
period 1820 to 1965. But socioeconomic dispari-
ties in height have also decreased. The rich are
still, on average, taller than the poor, but the
height differential is much less than 200 years ago.
There is also a considerable literature documenting
the long-term trend toward greater equality in
earnings in the United States and other advanced
industrial countries, a trend that, at least in the
United States, came to an end in the 1970s.
Improvements in the relative health and nutrition
of the poor undoubtedly contributed to a reduc-
tion in income inequality, particularly over the
longer term. Fogel (1994) has shown that in
France in the eighteenth century, some 10 percent
of the population was so malnourished that it
lacked the energy for any work and that another
10 percent had only sufficient energy for three
hours of light work a day.
4.THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN HEALTH,
LONGEVITY, AND WEALTH 
The relationship between health, longevity, and
health care expenditures
It is not clear a priori what effect medical inter-
ventions may have on average lifetime health care
costs. Medical interventions may increase average
lifetime health care costs if people who would
otherwise have died survive in poor health and go
on to have higher-than-average lifetime health
care costs. On the other hand, those who previ-
ously survived in poor health may now survive in
better health and go on to have lower lifetime
health care costs than they would have incurred 
in the absence of the intervention.
Consider the case of low–birth-weight infants,
referred to in the literature as “marginal” infants.
As explained previously, improvements in post-
natal care may improve the average health of the
population by enabling those who would have 
survived anyway to survive in better health, but it
may also decrease it by enabling those who would
otherwise have died to survive but with disabili-
ties and in poor health.
Cutler and McClellan (2001) suspect that the
share of marginal infants with medical and devel-
opmental problems is much the same now as it
was in 1950. If, as a result of improvements in
medical technology, a greater number of marginal
infants are now surviving, then medical interven-
tions to save marginal infants may have increased
average lifetime health costs, even excluding the
cost of the initial intervention.
9
Alliance Policy Report: Do Health and Longevity Create Wealth?
10
Alliance Policy Report: Do Health and Longevity Create Wealth?
We can obtain a more complete picture from the
tables in Cutler and Meara (2000), who report
changes at ten-year intervals in survival probabili-
ties for babies of various birth weights over the
period 1950 to 1990, and the change over the period
1960 to 1990 in the percentages of survivors in
each birth-weight category with developmental
problems. Among babies weighing 1,000 to 1,499
grams, the survival rate almost exactly doubled,
from 47.8 to 94.3 percent, during the period 1960
to 1990. But the percentage of survivors with
health problems fell more than proportionately,
from 68 to 28 percent, implying that the propor-
tion of babies born in that weight range who sur-
vived with health problems fell by 19 percent.
However, as mentioned previously, it is important
to note that the medical choices that doctors, par-
ents, and governments make will influence the 
relative magnitude of the two effects. At one
extreme, one might choose to withhold care from
those babies that one expected would die in the
absence of care but to survive in poor health if
provided with care. At the other extreme, one
could choose to provide all treatment that
increased survival probabilities, regardless of the
anticipated quality of life or anticipated lifetime
medical costs.
The direct and indirect impacts of health on
labour productivity 
The most direct and obvious way in which health
can affect wealth is by limiting an individual’s ability
to perform his chosen occupation. Healthy workers
are likely to be more productive than the sick in
fairly obvious ways. They will take fewer days’ sick
leave and will have greater physical strength.
Particularly at older ages, some individuals may be
in such poor health as to be incapable of work.
One does, in fact, observe strong cross-section and
time-series relationships between health and wage
earnings in both individual level and aggregate
data. The problem is one of establishing causality.
Better health may make workers more productive.
On the other hand, higher earnings may make
health care more affordable, although it is note-
worthy that there is a strong relationship between
health and labour-market earnings even in those
countries in which health care is free at the point of
consumption. Other explanations for the observed
relationship between health and earnings include
the possibility that there is a positive correlation
between the inherited components of health and
intelligence, or that some third factor, for example
education, increases earnings and also leads to the
adoption of behaviours that improve health.
There is evidence that earnings inequalities that
appear to be unrelated to health may in fact have
a health-related component. For example,
Edwards and Grossman (1977) found that an
individual’s health in childhood can affect his
ability to benefit from education and thus indi-
rectly affect his subsequent earnings. There is
even the possibility of multiple feedbacks, with
education affecting adult health (see Wilson 2001
and Berger and Leigh 1988) and adult health in
turn affecting adult earnings.
There is a substantial literature that examines the
relationship between health and productivity in
Third World countries (Ram and Schultz 1979;
Bhargava 1997; Strauss 1986; Thomas and Strauss
1997; Strauss and Thomas 1998; and Basta et. al.
1979). Basta examined the effect of giving iron
supplements to a sample of Indonesian rubber tap-
pers, many of whom suffered from anemia. A con-
trol group received placebos. The treatment group
achieved substantial increases in productivity rela-
tive to the controls.
The findings of these studies may have only limited
applicability to advanced industrial economies
where a much smaller proportion of the popula-
tion works in agriculture and in other physically
demanding occupations and the average level of
health is much better. But even in advanced
economies, a nonnegligible proportion of older
persons suffers from incapacities that either pre-
vent these people from working or limit the kinds
of work they can perform. In some cases, these
limitations are institutionalised, for example in coal
mining, where workers transfer from higher paid
but physically demanding underground work to
lower paid but less demanding surface work as
their health declines.
Studies indicate a strong relationship between
health status and labour market outcomes, even in
advanced industrial economies. Uccello (1998) ana-
lyzes data from the 1990 panel of the Survey of
Income and Program Participation and the 1994
wave of the Health and Retirement Study. She finds
that significant proportions of older workers have
health conditions that limit their ability to work or
prevent them from working altogether, that individ-
uals in physically demanding occupations are more
likely to retire early, and that the earlier an individ-
ual leaves the labour force the more likely it is that
he has health problems that prevent him from
working. Boaz and Muller (1990) find that individ-
uals are not using poor health as a socially accept-
able excuse to justify early retirement, and that
those who retire early subsequently consume more
medical care and suffer higher mortality than those
who remain in the labour force.
However, Smith (1999) finds evidence that episodes
of even serious ill health result in relatively modest
out-of-pocket medical expenses and losses of labour
income. He nonetheless found that ill health led to
substantial wealth reductions, suggesting that out-
of-pocket medical costs and losses of labour income
may understate the total financial costs of ill health.
He speculated about what these out-of-pocket costs
might be, for example transportation, reconfigura-
tion of home-care environments, and so on, but the
data set contains insufficient detail on consumer
expenditure to permit further investigation. An
alternative explanation for the observed relationship
might be that individuals suffering ill health reassess
their longevity and increase the rate at which they
decumulate their wealth.
An alternative to using household-level microdata
is to make a cross-country comparison of aggre-
gate data. Bloom et al. (2001) examined data on
104 countries for the periods 1970 to 1980 and
1980 to 1990. They modelled growth in output
over each of these periods as a function of changes
in total factor productivity, physical capital, the
size of the labour force, and three components of
human capital—schooling, work experience, and a
measure of health status. As there are no interna-
tionally comparable measures of health status cov-
ering such a large number of countries, they used
increases in life expectancy at birth as a proxy for
improvements in health status. Although the paper
does not indicate whether they used period or
cohort life expectancies, they do in fact correctly
use period tables.10 They obtain a strong result,
finding that a one-year increase in life expectancy
raises worker productivity by 4 percent. Meltzer
(1992) found that mortality reductions, particularly
reductions at younger ages, increased economic
growth by increasing the average duration of pay-
back to investments in education and therefore the
optimal amount to invest.
Models of this type can be used to estimate the
impact on economic growth of health and mortal-
ity shocks, such as the AIDS-related increase in
mortality in sub-Saharan Africa and the mortality
crisis in the former Soviet Union. Bloom and
Malaney (1998) conclude that increases in mortal-
ity have been “at most a small contributor to
Russia’s poor macroeconomic performance,”
reducing the rate of economic growth or, more
correctly, increasing the rate of economic decline,
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by one-third of 1 percent a year over the period
1990 to 1995.
However, it is by no means certain that changes in
the life expectancy of the whole population are a
good proxy for contemporaneous changes in the
health of people of working age. Changes in life
expectancy are only imperfectly related to changes
in mortality among the working-age population,
which is in turn imperfectly related to changes in
the health of that population. In particular, if one
regards health as a stock, then current-period mor-
tality may reflect not only current but also past
health. Current-period mortality reductions may
likewise reflect not only current but also past
improvements in health, so that current-period
health improvements may be incorrectly estimated
from contemporaneous reductions in mortality.
Nonetheless, the strong results may be difficult to
attribute to non–health-related causes.
The impact of health on household wealth 
accumulation
Health status may directly affect wealth accumula-
tion by limiting an individual’s capacity to work. It
may also affect it indirectly because a shorter life
span, a reduced ability to work, and possibly a
reduction in the ability to absorb education will
reduce the return an individual can obtain from his
and his family’s investment in his education and,
thus, the amount that an individual and his family
choose to invest in his education.
However, childhood health may also be correlated
with other factors that affect subsequent earnings,
for example the socioeconomic status of the child’s
family. To identify the direct effects of health on
wealth accumulation ideally requires a completely
unanticipated health shock occurring after the age
at which most people finish education. The
American Civil War provides just such a natural
experiment. It exposed individuals to an environ-
ment in which disease was rampant. Lee (2003)
analyzed the health records of Union Army
recruits. At an individual level, a correlation
between ill health during service and subsequent
wealth accumulation may reflect differences in per-
sonal characteristics, so Lee used the casualty rate
of the company in which the individual served as a
proxy for the severity of the health shock. He
found that health while in service had a strong
effect on subsequent wealth accumulation. For
example, men who fought in companies that lost
at least 5 percent of their men due to injuries accu-
mulated 46 percent less wealth by 1870 than men
who served in companies that suffered zero losses.
The impact of increased longevity on the
dependency ratio
The dependency ratio is the ratio of economically
inactive persons to labour force participants. It is
sometimes adjusted to reflect the fact that needs,
particularly health care needs, vary over the life
course. It is primarily determined by mortality, fer-
tility, and labour force participation rates.11
Mortality reductions among prime-age workers
may initially decrease the dependency ratio.
However, mortality reductions at ages when work-
ers have retired must, as a matter of arithmetic,
increase the dependency ratio unless the average
age of retirement increases. If the country’s per
capita capital stock does not increase, an increase
in the dependency ratio will result in a decline in
per capita consumption.12
Although dependency ratios are projected to
increase in almost all countries, a substantial part
of the increase is the result of changes in fertility
rates that are only an indirect consequence of
increased longevity, if at all. In the United States,
the current relatively low dependency ratio reflects
a fortuitous combination of events. During the
interwar period, the fertility rate declined dramati-
cally. Almost all the babies born during that period
have now retired, and the low fertility rate during
the interwar period had the effect of reducing the
number of individuals who are currently retired.
During the postwar period, there was a baby
boom. These babies are now, of course, of working
age, and the high birth rate during the postwar
period has had the effect of decreasing the current
dependency ratio. Subsequently, there was a
decline in the birth rate, reducing the number of
dependent children. Had the 1930s baby bust and
the 1950s baby boom not occurred, the current
dependency ratio would be substantially higher.
The impact on the dependency ratio of reductions
in mortality depends crucially on the effect that
these mortality reductions and associated
improvements in health have on the labour force
participation rates of older workers. Models that
ignore these interactions are likely to produce
seriously misleading forecasts. Börsch-Supan
(2003) examines the case of Germany and makes
a variety of assumptions about increases in
longevity and labour force participation, trends in
fertility and unemployment rates, and the average
age of retirement. He considers a number of alter-
native scenarios—for example, in his most opti-
mistic scenario average retirement age increases 
by five years, whereas in his most pessimistic it
increases not at all.
Under his most optimistic labour force participa-
tion assumptions, he projects that the dependency
ratio will increase from its current 55 percent to
77 percent by 2050, holding all other assumptions
constant. However, under his most pessimistic
labour force participation assumptions, he proj-
ects that the dependency ratio will increase to
120 percent.
Many of the most pessimistic projections of
dependency ratio increases assume no increase in
the age of retirement, and one obtains quite differ-
ent forecasts if one makes different but plausible
assumptions. For example, Toder and Solanki
(1999) calculate that if in the United States, which
admittedly has a higher fertility rate than
Germany, people were to delay retirement so as to
maintain a constant number of years in retirement
as longevity increased, the 2040 dependency ratio
would be no less than that in 1997.
So what factors might affect the labour force par-
ticipation rate of older workers? Burtless (2003)
provides an analytical framework for considering
this question. Individuals face a tradeoff between
leisure and consumption. They can retire young
and enjoy low per-period consumption or retire
later and enjoy higher per-period consumption.
If longevity increases, the individual can enjoy pre-
ferred combinations of consumption and leisure.
Assuming a constant real wage, an individual
could, for example, spend the same number of
years in retirement but enjoy greater per-period
consumption because a greater proportion of his
adult life will be spent working. Although we
would normally expect both lifetime consumption
and lifetime leisure to increase in response to an
increase in longevity, it is perfectly conceivable that
an individual might choose to reduce either his
lifetime consumption or his lifetime leisure.
An important implication of the analysis is that
increased longevity makes people better off, even if
they choose not to increase lifetime consumption,
because they get to enjoy additional leisure, which
presumably has at least some value.
The cost of additional leisure is the consumption
foregone. If individuals can earn very little in the
labour market beyond current retirement ages,
then taking additional leisure will involve relatively
small consumption losses, and an increase in
longevity might result in only a small increase in
the average age of retirement.13 But if the improve-
ments in health that are associated with increased
longevity increase the productivity of older workers
and shift the terms of the tradeoff between labour
13
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and leisure, then one might expect a more substan-
tial increase in the age of retirement.
The reward to continued employment is not merely
the net wage, but also the part of the increase in
the expected present value of the employee’s pen-
sion entitlements that results from continued
labour force participation. In a defined benefit
(DB) pension plan, the monthly pension to which
the individual will be entitled upon retirement may
increase very little once he has attained the early or
normal retirement age specified in the plan.14 On
the other hand, delaying retirement involves for-
feiting a year’s pension income. At advanced ages,
the pension reward to working an additional year
can be small or even negative, with the present
value of the increase in the monthly pension being
insufficient to compensate for the fact that it will
be now be paid for one year less.
Several studies have shown that the age-related
incentives in Social Security and employer pen-
sions have a powerful effect on retirement pat-
terns. Friedberg and Webb (2003) calculate that
the age-related incentives in DB pension plans
cause employees to retire two years earlier than in
the absence of those incentives. An international
study by Gruber and Wise (2004) found strong
evidence of a relationship between retirement pat-
terns and pension incentives.
DB pension plans are gradually being displaced by
defined-contribution plans, which lack these age-
related incentives, while steps have been taken to
reduce similar age-related incentives in Social
Security. It is difficult to forecast what effect these
reforms might have on labour force participation
rates among older persons. Although over the last
50 to 100 years declines in the average age of
retirement have been associated with an increase in
the prevalence of DB pension plans and in the
generosity of Social Security, we cannot be certain
to what extent these changes caused the decline in
the age of retirement. Real incomes were also
increasing over this period, and it is quite plausible
that, as incomes rose, individuals chose to enjoy
longer periods of leisure at the end of their lives,
irrespective of the economic incentives. It is possi-
ble that some older workers have very strong pref-
erences for leisure and that labour market
participation rates will not increase much, regard-
less of what happens to potential earnings. Fogel
(2003) argues that societies have become so rich
that people are becoming saturated with goods
formerly thought of as luxuries and that as a result
they will increasingly choose additional leisure at
older ages in preference to additional consumption.
I find the hypothesis unconvincing. It is far from
obvious to me that the material wants of most of
the population are close to being satiated, while if
people were increasingly choosing leisure over addi-
tional consumption, one might expect the additional
leisure to be consumed over the individual’s life-
time rather than in old age. I believe that health
shocks and the pension-related disincentives to
labour supply by older workers documented by
Gruber and Wise (2004) are the principal causes
of early retirement.
Health undoubtedly plays a major part in the
retirement decisions of many workers, and we 
really need to better understand how increased
longevity will affect the health of older workers
and how health improvements might affect poten-
tial earnings if we are to forecast labour force 
participation rates of older workers.
Some older persons are in such poor health as to
be physically incapable of work. However, the
research of Steuerle et al. (1999) provides evidence
that the majority of workers are physically capable
of working beyond current retirement ages. There
is also evidence of a continuing improvement in
the health of older persons, although some
authors, for example Lakdawalla et al. (2003), fear
that increasing obesity may lead to a reversal of
this trend. An unwillingness to acquire new skills
on the part of some older workers and a lack of
training opportunities may be more significant
deterrents to the labour force participation by older
persons in a knowledge-based economy in which a
decreasing proportion of jobs requires strength and
stamina.15 However, Friedberg (2003) shows, in
relation to computer use, that it is not age but
impending retirement that acts as a deterrent to
the acquisition of new skills.
We can dismiss one possible reason for believing
that the labour force participation rates might 
not increase, or indeed should not increase, as a
result of increased longevity, namely the “lump of
labour” fallacy: the notion that there is a fixed
number of jobs available in the economy and that
a job given to one person is a job taken away
from someone else, leaving the dependency ratio
unchanged. This idea is entirely fallacious, and
there is every reason to believe that the labour
market would equilibrate supply and demand for
labour in response to an increase in labour supply
by older workers, just as it has accommodated
increases in the labour supply of women, particu-
larly married women.
Of course, per capita GNP excludes not only the
value of leisure but also nonmarket outputs, for
example family caregiving. The effect of improve-
ments in health on the quantity of such nonmar-
ket outputs is ambiguous. Health improvements
will make it possible for a greater proportion of
older persons to undertake such activities, but the
same health improvements may encourage some
to postpone retirement and reduce their supply of
nonmarket services. Improvements in the health
of the very old may reduce the demand for such
services if those improvements are of sufficient
magnitude to outweigh the increase in the num-
ber of older persons.
Placing a value on improvements in health and
longevity
National income accounts include the cost of
health care inputs, the cost of doctors’ and nurses’
salaries, and so on, whereas what people value is
not health care inputs but health care outputs,
reductions in mortality, and improvements in
health. So there is a strong case for restating those
accounts to include the outputs and exclude the
inputs.
There is a substantial literature that infers the value
that individuals place on mortality reductions from
the wages paid in occupations with differing levels
of mortality risk. It is not altogether clear that the
valuations obtained from an analysis of the deci-
sions of prime-age males working in manual occu-
pations can, or should, be extrapolated to other
types of individuals, and a lot might depend on the
precise purposes for which the valuations were to
be used. For example, a calculation of the economic
losses of the September 11 terrorist attack would
take into account the very high earnings of some of
the victims, but we might, for reasons of public
policy, wish to limit the amounts of compensation
paid to those victims from public funds.
Particular problems arise in relation to the valua-
tion of the lives of infants. The philosopher Peter
Singer controversially argues that infants have not
yet acquired a consciousness of their identity, and
that the death of an infant imposes no loss
beyond the pain and suffering their parents might
experience plus the cost to the parents (lost earn-
ings, medical expenses, and so on) of “replacing”
the lost infant. A “Singerian” approach to the 
valuation of reductions in infant mortality might
produce much smaller amounts than those
obtained from using valuations from the occupa-
tional choices of prime-age males. As develop-
ment of identity is a major process of childhood,
one might wish to adjust one’s estimate of the
15
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value of each remaining year of life or the dis-
count rate applied, according to the age at which
the probability of death is reduced.
On the other hand, estimates based on occupational
risk premia may understate the value of human
life because many high earners never engage in
risky occupations and never feature in the calcula-
tions. Although many people would feel very
uncomfortable with the idea that, when deciding
how to spend public money, one should attach
substantially greater weight to mortality reduc-
tions among the rich, one might wish to incorpo-
rate the high earners’ valuations of their mortality
reductions in calculations of the value to society of
new medical discoveries. It is also possible that
less risk-averse people self-select into risky occu-
pations, and that more risk-averse people in other
occupations would demand higher premia, or that
people who enter risky occupations systematically
underestimate the risks involved or their ability to
limit those risks. Some people may have little
choice in the occupations they pursue, and lack of
alternative work, for example in a mining commu-
nity, may depress the level of earnings in the risky
occupation.
Nordhaus (2002) uses values obtained from
research on prime-age males to calculate the 
value that people place on improvements in life
expectancy over the twentieth century, scaling back
earlier years’ values in line with the growth in con-
sumption.16 He calculated that the value people
place on the mortality reductions that occurred over
the period 1900 to 1995 was equivalent to the
value they would place on an annual increase in
consumption of between 2.2 and 3.0 percent,
depending on the computational assumptions.
Consumption growth over that period averaged 
2.1 percent, so mortality reductions contributed
more to improvements in well-being than did
increases in the consumption of goods and services.
Nordhaus considers the possibility that the prime-
age males typically studied in the calculations of
the value of human life may place a higher value
on mortality reductions than the older persons
who are the primary beneficiaries of recent mor-
tality reductions.17 The results were only slightly
affected when he incorporated plausible age-
related variations in the value of a statistical life.
There is a number of potential biases in
Nordhaus’s calculations. First, the calculations of
the value of a statistical life refer to prime-age
males who are likely to be in good health. People
who survive in poor health may place much lower
values on reductions in mortality. But, on average,
health status has greatly improved over the last
century, and an accounting that included health
status would almost certainly result in larger bene-
fits than those referred to above.
Second, calculations of the value of a statistical life
typically take as their starting point the risk pre-
mium that people require in order to work in a 
particular occupation. As mentioned above, these
calculations may not be representative of the aver-
age value placed on a statistical life by the popula-
tion as a whole.
Third, the greatest reductions in mortality have
been among the poor, who, if only because of their
lesser financial resources, may place a lower dollar
value on mortality reductions than the rich. The
use of population average valuations of a statistical
life will therefore tend to overstate the average 
valuation placed on mortality reductions because
the greatest reductions have occurred among those
with the lowest valuations.
Fourth, one can apply precisely the same arguments
that Nordhaus uses to justify substituting the value
of health outputs for the cost of health inputs to
the valuation of the many new goods and services
made available during the twentieth century. The
prices at which these goods are sold are very often
only a small fraction of the market value of the
quantities of existing goods and services that the
individual would be willing to sacrifice in order to
be able to consume the new good. As Nordhaus
concedes, calculations of growth in per capita GNP
almost certainly understate the value that individu-
als place on these new goods and services.
However, whatever adjustments one proposes, the
fact remains that the value of health improvements
is enormous. Nordhaus shows that over the period
1980 to 1990 the value of mortality reductions was
approximately twice the increase in health care
expenditures, some of which will have been spent on
procedures that enhanced the quality rather than the
quantity of life. If the health care expenditures were
the sole cause of the mortality reductions, then soci-
ety has benefited from the health care expenditures,
ignoring the economic distortions of the taxes
required to pay for them. But, as Nordhaus con-
cedes, factors other than health care expenditures,
for example improvements in diet and housing, have
very likely contributed to the reductions in mortal-
ity. Furthermore, to the extent that mortality reduc-
tions are the result of health care expenditures, they
will be the result not only of current expenditures
but also of expenditures of a different magnitude
and character incurred over the lifetimes of the indi-
viduals concerned. Even if we accept that the overall
return from health care expenditures has been in
excess of the amount expended, we still do not know
whether, at various margins, health care expenditures
have been cost-effective. Some treatments may, on
average, pass the cost-effectiveness test, others may
not, and the cost-effectiveness of any particular
treatment will also vary from patient to patient,
depending on the patient’s age and state of health.
An alternative approach is to examine the relation-
ship between increases in total medical expendi-
ture and overall reductions in mortality.
Lichtenberg (2002) estimated the contribution of
medical expenditures and innovations to increased
longevity, innovations being measured in terms of
new molecular entities approved by the FDA.
A significant problem in analyses of this type is
reverse causality. We observe that medical expendi-
tures, the range of available drugs, and longevity
are all increasing over time. In relation to medical
expenditures, we need to distinguish between 
the hypothesis that the expenditures are causing the
reduction in mortality and the alternative hypothe-
sis that reductions in mortality are causing the
increase in expenditures, for example because older
people require more medical care. Lichtenberg
addresses this problem by substituting lagged
health expenditures for current health expenditures
in an econometric model in which mortality
reduction is the dependent variable and by testing
whether there is a relationship. He claims that this
year’s medical expenditure is not going to cause
last year’s reduction in mortality.18 
He rejects the reverse causality hypothesis and
shows that drug releases and medical expenditures
have significant effects on mortality. He estimates
the medical expenditure costs of a life year saved at
only $11,053 in 1982–84 dollars. Most studies have
put a lower bound of around $100,000 on the value
of a life year, so, even allowing for inflation, this sug-
gests a very substantial return on the expenditure.
Yet another approach is to focus on the costs 
and benefits of treatment of particular diseases.
Cardiovascular disease is the leading cause of
death in the United States. Cutler et al. (1999)
show that the increase in expenditure on treating
heart attacks reflects an increase in the intensity
of treatment. They calculate that additional
expenditure of $4,000 per patient has increased
average life span by eight months. This represents
a good return under almost any assumptions
regarding the value of life and the quality of life
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that these survivors enjoy. However, the analysis
does not distinguish between average and mar-
ginal effects.
An important conclusion of this line of research 
is that, given plausible assumptions regarding the
value of human life, even small mortality reduc-
tions produce returns that greatly exceed the relat-
ed medical expenditures. For example, Murphy
and Topel (1999) calculate that the economic value
of cures for cancer and heart disease amounts to
$95 trillion. This figure is for the United States
alone. One would have to double it at least to
include the benefits to individuals living in other
advanced industrial economies. Even a 1 percent
reduction in cancer mortality would be worth 
$500 billion. By comparison, the United States
spent only $35 billion on all kinds of medical
research in 1995, so that even quite small reduc-
tions in mortality would be cost-effective.
The impact of health and longevity on invest-
ments in human and physical capital
There are several plausible transmission mecha-
nisms from health to investments in human capital
and also some possible feedbacks from investments
in human capital back to health. A first transmis-
sion mechanism is simply that a healthy child may
be better able to absorb knowledge and less likely
to miss school. For example, Lozoff et al. (2000)
show that iron deficiency has a long-term impact
on educational attainment. Case et al. (2003) and
Case et al. (2002) find evidence that childhood
health can have a lasting impact on educational
attainment and adult health and earnings even in
advanced countries. Macrolevel studies, for exam-
ple Bloom et al. (2001), reach similar conclusions.
A second transmission mechanism is that
increased longevity increases the payback to invest-
ment in education by increasing the expected 
present value of a lifetime’s additional wages.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2000) review the literature
and go on to predict significant effects in a cali-
brated overlapping generations model, an economic
model containing households at all stages of the
life cycle.
A third transmission mechanism is that reductions
in infant mortality may lead parents to desire fewer
children. Researchers disagree as to the extent to
which the decline in fertility is attributable to 
the decline in child mortality (for a review, see
Kalemli-Ozcan 2002). With imperfect capital 
markets, parents may be either unwilling or unable
to make the optimal level of investment in their
children’s K–12 education. A reduction in fertility
may enable parents to more closely approach their
desired level of investment, thus providing an 
additional channel through which a reduction in
mortality may increase investment in human capital.
A number of papers (Berger and Leigh 1988;
Lleras-Muney 2002; and Arkes 2003), find 
evidence that education can in turn result in
improved health so that societies may enter a 
virtuous circle of improvements in both health 
and education.
An important point made by Bloom and Canning
(2003) is that increased longevity increases the 
average level of experience of the workforce.
Studies have shown that the effect of experience
on labour productivity can be as large as the effect
of education. Of course, if levels of education are
increasing over time, then this effect will be offset
by the fact that these older workers will have, on
average, fewer years of schooling than younger
cohorts.
An interesting study is that of Alsan et al. (2004),
who claim that health positively affects inflows of
foreign direct investments in low- and middle-
income countries. As previously mentioned, it is
difficult to obtain internationally comparable
measures of health status, so they follow previous
work by using life expectancy at birth as a proxy
for health status. They control for a variety of fac-
tors that might influence a country’s attractiveness
to foreign investors. A possible concern is that
there might be some unobservable factor that
could influence both life expectancy and the coun-
try’s attractiveness to investors. One obvious such
factor is the quality of the country’s institutions,
which they control for through measures of
bureaucratic quality and governmental corruption,
but there may possibly be others that the authors
are failing to capture. But on the face of it, the
results are compelling.
The demographic dividend
One of the indirect effects of improvements in
health and increases in longevity on capital forma-
tion is through the so-called demographic divi-
dend. In preindustrial times, human societies were
characterised by high fertility and a relatively short
life expectancy. The dependents were mainly chil-
dren, as relatively few people survived to old age.
The demographic revolution of increased longevity
and low fertility will eventually lead to a new equi-
librium in which there will be proportionately
fewer dependent children and proportionately
many more dependent old people. During the
transition, the dependency ratio falls, as the pro-
portion of the population that is elderly is not 
yet at its new equilibrium level. The transition 
increases per capita income directly because there
are fewer dependents among whom each worker’s
product has to be shared, and possibly indirectly 
if the process results in an increase in the capital
stock and therefore per capita income.
Many authors claim that the increase in savings
rates in East Asian countries can be attributed to
increased longevity. They postulate two mecha-
nisms. First, if, as a result of increased longevity
living to retirement is now a realistic prospect,
then increased longevity will stimulate life-cycle
savings. Second, the country will experience a
temporary increase in the proportion of prime-
age workers, who are life-cycle savers, relative to
older persons, who are life-cycle “dissavers.”
Bloom et al. (2004), and indeed many other
authors, suggest that increased longevity may stim-
ulate saving for retirement. These authors correctly
point out that saving for retirement will occur only
when mortality rates have fallen low enough for
retirement to be a realistic prospect. But, in the
absence of the age-related incentives provided by
employer pensions and Social Security, one might
plausibly regard people as planning to retire not at
some fixed age regardless of health but at an age
when declines in health have increased the disutility
of work and decreased the returns to work by suffi-
cient amounts. If increasing longevity is associated
with a compression in morbidity, one might expect
the duration of retirement to decrease, not increase,
with increases in longevity and for retirement sav-
ings to fall. The truth, I suspect, is more complex,
and that retirement is a luxury good that individu-
als wish to consume substantially more of as their
incomes increase. So increasing longevity makes a
lengthy retirement possible, increasing incomes
make it desirable, and the combined effect increases
household savings.
Bloom and Canning (2003) make the point that
the demographic dividend will increase savings
only if saving is attractive. It is no surprise that
Latin America, with a history of inflation, economic
instability, and generous pay-as-you-go pension
systems, has not enjoyed an East Asian-style 
savings boom. Households clearly have less need 
to make life-cycle savings if their retirement con-
sumption is to be met by a pay-as you-go pension
system. However, Bloom and Canning may be
overgeneralising when they say that “in East Asia
workers have had to rely on their private savings or
on government schemes that are funded by forced
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saving and asset accumulation.” Although this
statement is undoubtedly true of some countries,
Singapore (which is not, of course, in East Asia)
being the most famous example, it is not true of
Japan, which has a not ungenerous pay-as-you-go
pension system, the sustainability of which is now 
a matter of intense debate.
Economists still have only a limited understand-
ing of the determinants of household savings. It
varies considerably from year to year, and in the
United States has declined considerably since the
1960s. The life-cycle model of savings behaviour
postulates that households save during their
working lives and dissave in retirement. Yet many
households save little, and the evidence for
postretirement dissaving is mixed. Nonetheless,
savings rates, measured as increases in net finan-
cial assets, expressed as a percentage of household
income, are highest among those aged 40 to 60,
and some of this is undoubtedly life-cycle related.
In a pay-as-you-go pension system with a high
replacement rate, workers have little or no need
to make life-cycle savings for their old age. In a
funded system, workers will accumulate wealth
and the retired will decumulate. In equilibrium,
the savings of workers will be matched by the
asset decumulation of older persons.19 During the
transition, the savings of the workers will exceed
the decumulations of older persons, and the coun-
try’s capital stock will increase. Once the 
country attains a new equilibrium, the capital-
output ratio will no longer increase but will
nonetheless be permanently higher than before.
Using simulation techniques and, crucially,
assuming a fixed retirement age, Auerbach and
Kotlikoff (1992) show that in the United States
increased longevity may initially increase the 
savings rate although eventually the dissaving of
older persons will also increase. Lee et al. (2000)
simulate the effect of population aging in Taiwan
and show that the demographic transition can
account for the extremely high savings rates
observed in that economy.
In advanced industrial countries, most retirement
savings are invested in stocks and bonds.20
Although the rates of return obtained by individ-
ual households may be affected by their particular
investment choices, management charges, and
design features of DB plans, the average rate of
return is very largely determined by average stock
and bond market returns. In developing countries,
capital markets may be less developed. In countries
where households lack access to the credit market,
or where there is a history of war, inflation, or gov-
ernment expropriation, much retirement savings
may be in the form of land, real estate, gold, and
cattle. These assets may yield low, zero, or even
negative real rates of return. For example, the mar-
ginal return to additional investment in cattle may
be negative if the additional cattle result in over-
grazing, and gold, which provides no income, car-
ries insurance and storage costs. The ability of a
society to profit from the demographic dividend
may well depend on the quality of its government
and the efficiency of its financial markets.
It is clear that a society will be poorer if its institu-
tions do not permit savings to be allocated to the
most profitable uses. However, economic theory is
ambiguous as to the effect of the rate of return on
the amount a household will save for retirement.
An increase in the rate of return may have both
income and substitution effects. An increase in the
rate of return makes it possible for the household
to enjoy greater consumption in all periods, and
this will decrease the amount saved. It also increases
the amount of consumption that can be enjoyed in
the future, per dollar of current consumption fore-
gone, providing an incentive to additional saving.
The very high savings rates in East Asia took place
in an environment of low inflation and were asso-
ciated with the establishment of institutions
designed to facilitate the channelling of household
savings to productive uses. This does not necessar-
ily demonstrate causality, as the institutions may
have been created in response to an initially strong
taste for savings on the part of households.
The impact of population aging on the structure
of the economy
Börsch-Supan (2003) highlights the impact that
population aging is likely to have on the pattern of
demand for goods and services and thus on the
pattern of demand for labour. These changes are
likely to happen quite slowly, giving labour and
capital markets time to reallocate resources away
from areas of declining demand to areas of increas-
ing demand. Labour and capital markets may
adjust more slowly in Europe than in the United
States, whose labour and capital markets are often
regarded as being more flexible and responsive.
Although certain categories of expenditure, such as
medical care, may increase at the expense of reduc-
tions elsewhere, and the demand for some skills,
for example those held by health care profession-
als, may increase, there seems no a-priori reason to
expect that changes in patterns of demand will
have a significant effect on the rate of economic
growth or the distribution of income. Many cate-
gories of expenditure are common to people of all
ages. More fundamentally, to demonstrate that
changes in patterns of demand will affect the
growth or distribution of income, it is necessary to
show that the goods and services consumed by
older people differ systematically in the average
skill requirement of the labour inputs or the capital
intensity or rate of technical progress of their pro-
duction. But, at first glance, it is difficult to discern
any systematic relationship, and I suspect that cap-
ital and labour markets will smoothly respond to
changes in the pattern of demand, in just the same
way as they have adapted to many other changes
in the pattern of demand, without any significant
changes in factor prices.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
Increased longevity and the dependency ratio
There is a widely held view that increased
longevity will increase the proportion of frail
dependents in society and condemn us to reduced
real incomes. I believe there are many reasons to
reject this view. First, the increase in the depend-
ency ratio is not only a result of increased
longevity but also is in large part the result of
declines in the birth rate. It seems strange that
rather than regarding the stabilisation of the
world’s population as a great achievement we
should now regard it as a curse.
Second, the evidence clearly shows that increases
in longevity are associated with improvements in
the average level of health, particularly among
older persons. Pessimistic forecasts of the increase
in the dependency ratio invariably assume either
no increase or only a small increase in labour
force participation rates among older persons.
The fact that labour force participation rates by
older persons are so low in advanced industrial
economies probably says less about the ability or
willingness of older persons to work than about
the financial incentives to greater labour force
participation. The reform of employment legisla-
tion and pension and Social Security systems so
as to provide appropriate incentives and opportu-
nities for continued employment, while safe-
guarding those who are no longer capable of
work, is essentially a political problem that does
not seem to me to be insoluble.
Third, even if labour force participation rates
among older persons do not increase, for example
because older persons have a strong taste for
leisure, the economic consequences are likely to
be a modest reduction in the rate of growth in
per capita income to which we have become
accustomed rather than actual declines in per
capita income.
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Increased longevity and health care costs
Health care consumes an ever increasing percent-
age of national income. It would be incorrect to
attribute all, or even most, of the increase in health
care spending to increased longevity. Medical
expenditure is determined to a large extent by
increasing incomes and new technology. Richer
societies understandably choose to spend some
part of the additional resources now available to
them on purchasing better health in the same way
as they also choose better houses and better cars.
It is also understandable that new medical tech-
nology, which expands the range of treatment possi-
bilities, should increase demand for health care.
When health care is free at the point of consump-
tion, people will demand it regardless of the cost
provided it offers some benefit however small.
This is not a cause for concern if we place an 
infinite value on reductions in mortality and in
the alleviation of pain and suffering. In reality, we
demonstrate through the choices that we make in
our day-to-day lives that we do not, in fact, place
an infinite value on such mortality reductions.
So, does medical expenditure represent value for
money given the valuations that we appear to
place on our lives?
The evidence of research into the relationship
between medical expenditures and overall mortal-
ity reductions and between specific classes of
expenditure and the mortality reductions associated
with those expenditures is that, on average,
medical expenditures offer a positive net return.
In fact, for plausible valuations of human life, the
returns greatly exceed the expenditures incurred.
Of course, this is not to say that, at the margin,
some classes of expenditure offer negative returns,
but there is no evidence that such negative returns
are systematic. So if we define wealth as including
the value that individuals place on their health,
health care expenditures have almost certainly led
to a net increase in wealth.
But does health actually increase wealth,
narrowly defined?
The emerging evidence is that health is really funda-
mental to worker productivity and stimulates the
investments in physical and human capital that are
essential to economic growth. This evidence is
derived not only from microlevel studies of house-
hold behaviour but also from macrolevel intercoun-
try comparisons. We are justifiably concerned about
rising health care expenditures, but we should also
be concerned about the risks of not making the
expenditures. Suppose that Bloom and Canning are
correct, and that good health boosts economic
growth by 0.3 to 0.5 percent a year.21 Compound
this over 50 years and you arrive at numbers that
dwarf health care expenditures. In order to deter-
mine how the lessons of the past may apply to the
future, we call for further research to deepen our
understanding of this vital issue.
1. Edmund Halley (of comet fame) created the
first modern life table in 1693, based on data from
the city of Breslau in what is now Poland.
2. In 2004, the highest infant mortality rate,
19.3 percent, was in Angola, but most developing
countries had rates around 5 percent. For example,
India was 5.8 percent, one-fifth of the rate in
eighteenth-century England.
3. We will never attain a perfectly steady state, even
in the absence of fresh perturbations, as the effects
of past perturbations echo across the generations.
For example, holding fertility levels constant we
can expect an echo of the baby boom as the
boomers’ children in turn have children. Further-
more, a steady state does not necessarily imply a
stable population. If, as seems likely, average com-
pleted family size after the demographic transition
is going to be less than the replacement rate, then a
steady state might result in a decreasing population.
4. If we place an infinite value on life or the allevia-
tion of pain and suffering, then all health treat-
ments are justified, regardless of cost, provided the
treatment offers some reduction in mortality risk 
or in the burden of pain and suffering, net of any
pain and suffering that the treatment might itself
involve. In practice, people are not willing to pay an
infinite amount to reduce their risk of dying, and
economists have developed techniques to calculate
the value of a statistical life, using, for example, data
on the wage premia required for risky occupations.
5. In South Africa in 2004, life expectancy at 
birth was 44.19 years, and the infant mortality 
rate 62.18 per 1,000 live births. In the U.S. in
1900, life expectancy at birth was 54.9 years,
but the infant mortality rate was 133 per 1,000 
(CIA’s World Factbook https://www.cia.gov/
cia/publications/factbook/index.html). Apart from
being a human tragedy, the pattern of “shortgevity”
in sub-Saharan Africa may be particularly 
economically harmful. Cogneau and Grimm (2002)
show that in Côte d’Ivoire, mortality among prime-
age workers is highest among those with higher
earnings and the most human capital.
6. Research into human capital was pioneered by
Gary Becker, the Nobel laureate. For an overview,
see Becker, Human Capital: An Empirical and Theo-
retical Analysis, With Special Reference to Education
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994).
7. Pensions can be either “funded” or financed on 
a pay-as-you-go basis. In a pay-as-you-go system,
each period’s pension contributions are used to pay
that period’s pension payments. In contrast, in a
funded pension, contributions are invested in real
or financial assets. Other things being equal, a
country with a funded system will have more capi-
tal than one with a pay-as-you-go system. The
U.S. Social Security system is almost entirely
unfunded, the assets of the Social Security trust
fund being negligible in relation to the present
value of the pension liabilities.
8. Researchers have attributed this increase to pub-
lic health problems associated with urbanisation. In
the latter decades of the twentieth century, there
has been an even more rapid increase in the per-
centage of Third World populations living in cities
without a corresponding rise in mortality. Indeed,
during the last 50 years, the most rapid reductions
in mortality have occurred in the Third World.
9. Union Army veterans were 0.18 inches taller than
the general population and therefore probably a lit-
tle healthier, so Fogel’s result, if anything, overstates
the health of the nineteenth-century population and
understates the subsequent decline. The data is,
however, representative of those who enlisted. By
1900, 90 percent of the veterans had applied for 
a pension, and of these, 90 percent had received a
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medical examination. Of course, only men were
liable for military service, but it seems reasonable 
to assume that women have enjoyed similar reduc-
tions in the incidence of chronic disease.
10. A period table shows the mortality risk of peo-
ple alive in a particular year. A cohort table shows
the mortality risk of people born in a particular
year. Changes in period table mortality from time t
to time t+1 will reflect changes in mortality during
that period. A comparison of the mortality pre-
dicted by the cohort table for those born at time t
with that predicted by the table for those born at
time t+1 reflects differences in past and projected
mortality improvements over a whole lifetime.
11. In most countries and time periods, net immi-
gration has had a much smaller impact.
12. The decline should be placed in context.
Börsch-Supan (2003) studied Germany, a country
with extremely low fertility. Even under his most
pessimistic scenario, half of the projected annual
increase in labor productivity over the period 2000
to 2050 would be eaten up by the increase in the
dependency ratio, which still leaves the other half
available to finance increased consumption.
Germans will continue to increase their consump-
tion but not quite as rapidly as in the past.
13. Burtless (2003) shows that average male earn-
ings in the U.S. peak around age 45. The subsequent
decline is only partly explained by reductions in
hours. It is possible that there is a selection effect
with higher-earning workers better able to afford
retirement. Membership in defined-benefit (DB)
pension plans has been shown to lead to early retire-
ment, and DB-plan members tend to have higher
earnings than the population as a whole.
14. A DB pension plan is one in which the pension
payable is some function of average or final salary
and years of service. In contrast, in a defined-
contribution pension plan, the pension is a function
of investment performance.
15. Actual or perceived age discrimination may 
play a part. In the United States, age discrimination
in employment has been illegal since 1986. Johnson
and Neumark (1997) offer evidence that age 
discrimination adversely affected the employment
prospects of older workers, but his data go back to
1966 to 1980. Garen et al. (1996) show that DB
pension schemes can reduce the probability of an
older person being hired for an entry-level position
because the cost to an employer of providing a DB
pension is much greater for an older hire.
16. Costa and Kahn (2002) calculate the value of
life over the period 1940 to 1980 and conclude
that the value of life has increased faster than the
rate of growth of per capita GNP. Using Costa and
Kahn’s figures would produce somewhat larger val-
uations of mortality improvements than those
obtained under an assumption of a fixed relation-
ship between per capita GNP and the value of life.
17. The value of life may be affected by whether
one’s spouse, friends, and family are also still alive.
DeLeire and Levy (2001) show the values women
(who are more likely than men to avoid risky occu-
pations) place on their own lives may be higher,
possibly because of differences in attitudes toward
family responsibilities, with women believing they
are literally irreplaceable.
18. It is not quite as absurd as it first appears to
claim that this year’s mortality reduction might
cause next year’s medical expenditure increase.
Mortality reductions may have the effect of caus-
ing people to survive in ill health and to incur
large medical expenditures the following year.
19. The young may save more if real incomes are 
rising, and aggregate saving may be lower if the
population size is declining.
20. The big exception is housing equity. It used
to be thought that little housing equity was con-
sumed in old age. More recent research, for
example by Walker (2004), shows that housing
wealth is often liquidated in old age. Sale of a
house often coincides with a precipitating shock,
such as the death of a spouse or entry into long-
term care. It is as yet unclear whether the sale
proceeds are used to pay medical and nursing
home bills or whether they are used for general
consumption or some other purpose.
21. See Bloom, David E., and David Canning,
2000, The health and wealth of nations, Science
287:1207.
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